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COULD CONSCIOUSNESS EMERGE FROM A MACHINE 
LANGUAGE? 
 
Genevieve H. Kaess 
Abstract    Behaviorists believe the following: if the output of 
artificial intelligence could pass for human behavior, AI must be 
treated as if it produces consciousness.  I will argue that this is not 
necessarily so.  Behaviorism might be useful in the short term, 
since we do not know what causes consciousness, but in the long 
term it embodies an unnecessary hopelessness.  I will attempt to 
establish in this essay that certain empirical knowledge of 
consciousness is within the realm of possibility.  I will then use my 
own definition of certain knowledge to shed light on ways in 




―The best reason for believing that robots might someday 
become conscious is that we human beings are conscious, and we 
are a sort of robot ourselves.‖1  Daniel Dennett‘s offhand 
introduction to his essay ―Consciousness in Human and Robot 
Minds‖ serves more generally as a summary of popular 
contemporary philosophical thought regarding artificial 
intelligence: it is possible, in theory, because human intelligence is 
                                                 
1Daniel C. Dennett, ―Consciousness in human and robot minds,‖ in Cognition, 
Computation & Consciousness, ed. Masao Io, Yasushi Miyashitatt and Edmund 
T. Rolls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 17. 
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possible.  Human life, and consciousness with it, is no more than 
the machinery of nature.  What remains unclear is to what degree 
(if at all) and in what ways the mechanisms that produce human 
consciousness must be imitated in order to create artificial 
consciousness, and whether knowledge of the creation of artificial 
consciousness can ever be certain.   
In this paper, I will argue that syntactical computer 
modeling is not sufficient for artificial consciousness.  I will 
approach this point by first examining views of philosophers 
(specifically Alan Turing and Hilary Putnam) who have suggested 
behaviorism as the standard by which to judge consciousness in 
artificial life.  I will suggest that although behaviorism provides an 
immediate solution to the problem of other minds, the adoption of 
behaviorism as a long-term solution embodies an unnecessary 
hopelessness regarding certain knowledge of consciousness.  
Applying the same standards for certain knowledge that we do for 
other phenomena, we can come to certain empirical knowledge of 
the causation of consciousness.  The rejection of this claim, I will 
argue, is dualistic.  Finally, using the standards that have 
traditionally been sufficient for certain knowledge, I will explain 
why one specific example (which I will discuss in section V) casts 




For simplicity‘s sake, the term ―artificial intelligence‖ (AI) 
will refer, in this paper, to artificial consciousness.  Traditionally, 
consciousness has been deemed an unnecessary (or at least not 
necessarily necessary) condition for artificial intelligence.  On the 
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contrary, I believe intelligence and consciousness to be 
inextricably linked.  Intelligence, by definition, is the capacity to 
learn and understand
2
; understanding is a feature of consciousness.  
Information processing, then, can only be qualified as intelligence 
if it has conscious manifestation.  Consciousness will be 
understood (in this paper) as thoughts and emotions such as 
humans experience them.  I exclude non-human animal 
consciousness from my definition because the goal of AI scientists 
is to produce human-like intelligence (which, by my definition, 
entails human-like consciousness).  By limiting the scope of the 
definition of AI in this way, a more comprehensible argument will 
emerge; current knowledge of the nature of consciousness in other 
organisms is imperfect, and any discussion of it would be based on 
conjecture.   
The science of AI depends on the truth of one basic 
assumption: consciousness is a natural physical process.  There is 
no spiritual realm of thought that exists separately from nature; 
therefore, provided limitless resources and a thorough 
understanding of the mind, we would be able to reproduce it 
artificially.  Computational AI depends on the possibility that this 
can be realized using computer programming.  In this paper, I will 
assume that AI is possible, but I will provide evidence that 
computational AI is not.  Henceforth, ―AI‖ will refer to 
computational artificial consciousness, and ―computational 
                                                 
2
This definitiveness of this definition is disputable.  However, there is no doubt 
that this is one commonly used definition of ―intelligence.‖  Since I am merely 
using it to justify my choice to define AI in the way that I do, and not as a 




functionalism‖ will be understood as the philosophical position 
that such AI is obtainable. 
To say that the creation of artificial intelligence can be fully 
realized through computer programming is tantamount to saying 
one of two things: (1) the human mind is itself nothing more than a 
computer
3
 – an information processing tool – or (2) computer 
programming and the mind can produce equivalent cognition 
without holding any additional features in common.  I will discuss 
the second possibility in section VI.  For the most part, 
computational functionalists hold that the first is true: information 
processing is the necessary feature of the mind.  Certainly it is true 
that the human brain has a biological medium distinct from that of 
a computer, but that is all it is: a medium that realizes and supports 
the brain‘s intrinsic informational processing.  Human 
consciousness, they believe, is a feature of the processes, not of the 
medium. 
Computer programming, at its most basic level, is a series 
of 0s and 1s, which answer the question of whether or not various 
features exist.  I will refer to these 0s and 1s as ―computer syntax.‖  
Computer syntax is itself a mechanical feature of the computer, 
which is programmed in by humans.  When prompted, it sets in 
motion a series of mechanical events within the computer that lead 
to the visible output on the screen or, in the case of AI, the 
observable actions of a robot.  The 1s and 0s can be combined in 
very complex ways to produce impressive outcomes.  In the 
1950‘s, the research of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon suggested 
                                                 
3




that ―a computer‘s strings of bits could be made to stand for 
anything, including features of the real world, and that its programs 
could be used as rules for relating these features.‖4 
The idea for AI was not born solely of the impressive 
capabilities of computers.  It emerged also from the notion that 
computer programming is the best model for the workings of the 
brain.  Most neurons give and receive signals in short blasts.  They 
operate under an all or nothing principle - either they‘re firing or 
they‘re not.  This is similar to the 1/0 duality of binary code.  AI 
scientists posited that these neuronal impulses could be modeled 
by computer programming to the same effect: intelligence. 
 
III. The Problem of Other Minds 
But how would we know if that happened?  Current 
scientific knowledge does not account for consciousness.  This is 
called the ―problem of other minds,‖ and it is the foundation, as 
well as the limiting factor, for philosophical arguments regarding 
AI: we do not know what exactly consciousness is, and therefore 
we cannot test for it in others.  One can only be certain of one‘s 
own consciousness.  For some philosophers, this is grounds for 
suggesting the adoption of a behavioral standard by which we 
might judge what constitutes intelligence and what does not. 
In his article ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖ 
Alan Turing described his most lasting contribution to philosophy 
– the ―Turing test.‖  Turing devised a game in which two people (a 
man – ―A‖ – and a woman – ―B‖) sit in separate rooms as an 
                                                 
4
 Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), x. 
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interrogator questions them.  All identifying features are hidden 
from the interrogator.  His goal is to determine which is the man 
and which the woman; the goal of one of the two competitors is to 
confuse the interrogator and the goal of the other is to help him.  
Turing then posed the question: ―What will happen when a 
machine takes the part of A in this game?‖5  The interrogator now 
must determine which of the two is the machine.  Turing asserted 
that if a machine could win this game as frequently as the typical 
human, it would be unfair to deny that it had consciousness.  After 
all, we do not require proof of consciousness in one another.  Until 
consciousness is de-mystified, Turing believed, we must adopt this 
principle of equity. 
Although the Turing test is not a definitive test for 
consciousness, many have accepted it as the standard.  We do not 
have the knowledge to recognize consciousness in others; therefore 
we are engaging in cognitive chauvinism if we suggest that a 
machine with humanlike cognitive capabilities (insofar as they are 
measurable) lacks consciousness.   Turing‘s solution is pragmatic: 
to avoid prejudice, we must judge consciousness in non-humans in 
the same way we do in humans – behaviorally.6  The strength of 
his position is that it is safe; it makes no conclusive claim about 
what constitutes consciousness, but instead suggests the adoption 
                                                 
5
 A.M. Turing, ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖ Mind 59, no. 236 
(1950): 434. 
6
 I would argue that we do not always usually use behavioral characteristics to 
determine whether other humans are conscious.  Instead, we assume that they 
are conscious (because of their biological status as humans) regardless of 
whether or not they could pass the Turing test.  However, I will grant Turing this 
point, since it is probably true that the reason we assume humans have 
consciousness, even if they cannot pass a Turing test, is because as a general 
rule, humans behave as if they are conscious. 
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of a standard.  
Hilary Putnam expressed slightly stronger opinions in his 
essay, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life‖: we cannot 
expect to gain complete understanding of psychological states by 
studying brain physiology.  ―Psychological laws are only statistical 
… to say that a man and a robot have the same ‗psychology‘ … is 
to say that the behavior of the two species is most simply and 
revealingly analyzed at the psychological level (in abstraction from 
the details of the internal physical structure), in terms of the same 
‗psychological states‘ and the same hypothetical parameters.‖7 For 
example, anger is defined by one‘s claims and actions, not physical 
brain states.  It is identified by behavioral features, not biological 
ones.  This being the case, Putnam contended that ―it is … 
necessary … that one be prepared to accept first-person statements 
by other members of one‘s linguistic community involving these 
predicates, at least when there is no special reason to distrust 
them.‖8 
Putnam constructed the following scenario to illustrate his 
point: suppose that sometime in the future the robots we have 
invented build robots of their own (Putnam calls these 
―ROBOTS‖).  The philosopher robots then sit around debating 
whether or not ROBOTS have consciousness.  This is akin to our 
current actions.  Since we do not understand consciousness, we 
have no less duty to ascribe consciousness to robots than we do to 
one another.  The question of consciousness, Putnam concludes, 
cannot currently be solved.  Whether robots should be treated as if 
                                                 
7
 Hilary Putnam, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life,‖ The Journal 
of Philosophy 61, no. 21 (1964): 677. 
8
 Putnam, Robots, 684. 
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they have consciousness, then, ―calls for a decision and not for a 
discovery.  If we are to make a decision, it seems preferable … to 
extend our concept so that robots are conscious – for 
‗discrimination‘ based on the ‗softness‘ or ‗hardness‘ of the body 
parts of a synthetic ‗organism‘ seems as silly as discriminatory 
treatment of humans on the basis of skin color.‖9 
 The acceptance of a behavioral standard may be the most 
appropriate immediate solution, but Turing and Putnam seem to 
have been content to let it go at that.  Turing declared the concept 
of consciousness ―too meaningless to deserve discussion.‖10  They 
adopted a perplexing stance for philosophers – agnosticism – and 
many contemporary philosophers are happy to follow suit; debate 
over consciousness is not just meaningless, they believe, but 
impossible to resolve.  The turn to behaviorism came not from 
conviction of its worth, but from the lack of a better option.  I will 
argue that such a position of hopelessness is unnecessary; 
consciousness can be known empirically. 
The problem of other minds rests on the assumption that 
consciousness is accessible only through first-hand experience.  
But this is dualistic.  If each person‘s consciousness exists only in a 
special bubble that has no physical manifestation, then it is not 
physical.  To say that consciousness is both material in nature and 
fundamentally undetectable is to make a claim that is dramatically 
inconsistent with contemporary scientific thought.  Substance is 
thought to break down into particles that have both charge and 
extension; if consciousness is material (an assumption required for 
                                                 
9
 Putnam, Robots, 691. 
10
Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence,  442. 
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any form of artificial intelligence), it must be detectable at some 
level if the detector knows where to look for it.  But that is the 
problem: how do we figure out what to look for when we don‘t 
know what to look for?  How do we make the connection between 
objectively viewed matter and that which we experience as 
consciousness? 
 Those who find the problem of other minds unsolvable 
might answer that we need proof, and that proof is impossible.  
First-hand experience cannot provide conclusive evidence 
regarding the nature of consciousness.  Self-reporting is not 
sufficient for understanding of consciousness, because we are 
unaware of the causal mechanisms within our own brains.  
However, it seems to me that if we could thoroughly observe an 
individual‘s brain in conjunction with honest reporting of his 
mental states, we would discover much about the nature of 
consciousness, and perhaps even its causation.  Honesty cannot be 
ensured for any given individual, but given numerous repetitions of 
the experiment and the assumption that most people are honest, 
useful data would emerge.  For example, consider the following: 
the materialist understanding of consciousness requires that it must 
be possible, in theory, to replicate minds. This would be done, 
perhaps, by tweaking one person‘s neurons in various ways until 
the person had the personality, memories, etc. of another; the 
purpose of this exercise would be to learn which changes in the 
features of the brain are necessary for changes in consciousness.
11
  
Depending on how we tweaked the neurons and to what effect, we 
                                                 
11
 Obviously, there are ethical and practical barriers that would prevent the 
manifestation of this scenario, but I intend it only as a hypothetical situation to 
help illustrate my later point. 
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could draw links between brain states and conscious experience, 
from which we could conclusively accept or reject computational 
functionalism. 
One objection might be that hypothetical scenarios like this 
one spawn sticky questions regarding personal identity.
 
  If my 
consciousness changes entirely to that of another person, or even if 
it just changes a little bit, do I really still exist or has my body just 
taken on a new identity?  If I cease to exist, then clearly I cannot 
testify regarding certain knowledge of the change in my 
consciousness, in which case the success of the experiment 
(drawing links between consciousness and brain state) will depend 
on correct behavioral analysis.  If I claim to have experienced a 
change from one personhood to another, in fact it suggests that I 
have not experienced such a change; upon becoming the second 
person, I would lose memory of the first.  Even slight changes 
might be impervious to awareness.  If I lose a memory, for 
example, and all memories of that memory, I cannot know that I 
have lost it.  Self-reporting, even combined with brain observation, 
therefore becomes an inadequate method for the discovery of 
mental causation and third-person reporting of consciousness is not 
definitive.  Furthermore, even if we do establish, using inductive 
reasoning, that a certain change in the brain produces a certain 
change in the nature of consciousness, it still does not speak to 
whether that feature of the brain caused that moment of 
consciousness itself.  The brain might be an intermediate link in 
the consciousness-producing causal chain.  For some philosophers, 
the lack of the plausibility of certain knowledge regarding the 




Those who get caught up on the problem of other minds are 
forgetting one of life‘s early lessons: knowledge of causation in the 
physical world is never certain.  Young children often are 
preoccupied by the question, ―Why?‖ Adults who are grilled by 
these children are usually eventually reduced to the answer, 
―Because that‘s just the way it is.‖  We can superficially 
understand causation, but when we examine our understanding, it 
becomes clear that all we actually do is recognize patterns.  For 
instance, we think we understand why a ball rolls (it was pushed) 
and we think we understand why the push causes the ball to roll 
(the transference of energy).  For many of us, the understanding 
ends there, but an expert in physics might be able to answer the 
question ―why?‖ a few more times.  Even our physics expert, 
however, is eventually forced to concede a lack of understanding.  
You do not wholly understand a cause if you do not understand the 
cause of the cause.  Furthermore, all of these alleged causal 
understandings are actually theories based on induction.  We 
believe that if the ball is pushed (under certain conditions), it will 
roll.  But that belief is based on our repeated observation of this 
phenomenon.  We have merely recognized a pattern, and 
concluded from it a causal relationship.  Humans are only capable 
of identifying correlation.  Causation is supposed, never known.
12
 
Furthermore, we assume similarity in internal structure in 
entities that display similar characteristics.  If a rat is born of a rat, 
looks like a rat and acts like a rat, we feel certain that it has internal 
organs much like those of other rats and we will come to 
                                                 
12
 David Hume, ―An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,‖ in Modern 
Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, Second Edition, ed. Roger Ariew 
and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009). 
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conclusions based on this assumption.  We believe in those 
conclusions with such absolute certainty that we bet our lives on 
them; rats are often used to test products to determine their safety 
for humans.  If we truly believed extreme variation in the physical 
nature of rats possible, such tests would be worthless.  Induction is 
by its nature uncertain, but humans trust it. 
If we adopt a standard for consciousness in the name of 
objectivity, but refuse to accept that the causation of consciousness 
can be understood empirically, we have, in fact, failed to view the 
situation objectively.  As the example of the rolling ball 
demonstrated, inductive correlative reasoning is good enough to 
use to identify other causal physical relationships.  In the case of 
the rolling ball, we have come to the inductive conclusion that 
pushing the ball causes it to roll.  If we repeatedly observe that a 
certain brain state corresponds to a certain mental characteristic, it 
is fair to assume causation, just as we assume that it is the push 
that causes a ball to roll, not that the push was an intermediate link 
in the causal chain
13
.  Correlative evidence can demonstrate a link 
(or lack thereof) between brain physiology and consciousness.  
This evidence can be used to make conclusive claims about the 
nature and causation of consciousness. 
Of course, the problem is that we have not yet accumulated 
enough correlative evidence to make conclusive claims about the 
causation of consciousness.  But the situation is not hopeless.  By 
adopting a position of behaviorism, one approaches this problem 
                                                 
13
 Additionally, if brain states are intermediate links in the causality of 
consciousness, then it is unlikely that syntactical modeling would produce 
consciousness, since it models a feature of brain states and would therefore be 
modeling an intermediate step. 
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from the wrong angle.  If you turn to robots for the answer to the 
question of consciousness, you are looking in the wrong place.  
Clearly, one cannot look into a robot to determine whether or not it 
has consciousness.  That would be like trying to determine whether 
something plays music without any knowledge or understanding of 
the nature of music.  A more practical course of action is to look 
for the root of consciousness, and to do that, it is far wiser to look 
where we assume it does exist (in humans) than where we are 
trying to create it (robots). 
 
IV. On Correlation 
 Correlation can be used in two ways.  First, as I have 
suggested, positive correlation can lead to valid causal claims.  If a 
light turns on every time I flip a functioning light switch, I might 
make the inductive claim that flipping a functional light switch 
causes a light to turn on.  Induction is useful, but not a logically 
strong form of reasoning.  It might be, for example, that one cause 
has two effects, and I correlate the two effects to each other rather 
than to their mutual cause.  For example, a faulty light switch 
might produce a spark immediately after I flip it, just before the 
light turns on.  I might induce that the spark causes the light to turn 
on.  This would have the same inductive validity as the claim that 
flipping the switch turns on the light, but it would not be correct. 
 Negative correlation, however, is logically conclusive.  
Only one instance of the correlation of A and B is required to 
disprove the conditional statement, ―If A, then not B.‖  For 
example, the belief that no dogs bite humans can be disproved by 
the single instance of a dog biting a human.  If use of computer 
programming to produce AI tends to have human-like results in 
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behavior, the behaviorist might inductively conclude that the two 
are equivalent and computational functionalism correct.  However, 
it takes only one demonstration that the brain and the computer, 
given equivalent structural changes, produce different results to 
show that, at the very least, our current programming provides a 
flawed model of the brain. 
 
V. Implications for Artificial Intelligence 
In Section III, it was established that the search for the root 
of consciousness need not be futile so long as one is looking in the 
right place: the human brain.  When we pose the question of 
whether AI might produce consciousness, it is important to recall 
that most of the initial hope for AI stemmed from its similarity to 
brain processes.  Neurons send signals to one another with short 
blasts of energy, which is in some ways similar to how computers 
process binary code.  However, it is important to note that this is 
not strictly true.  Not all neurons fire in short bursts; some send 
longer signals not accounted for by computer syntax.  Additionally, 
neurons exist in a net, whereas binary programming is linear.  In 
his book What Computers Still Can‘t Do, Hubert Dreyfus 
described the problem of ―know-how.‖  When a person becomes an 
expert at a task, he no longer needs to think through all the steps of 
the task, but rather the proper course of action is immediately 
obvious.  For example, a master chess player does not have to 
think through the rules of the game before making a move, but 
rather sees the position of the pieces on the board and knows 
instantly what to do.  By contrast, the more data the computer 
chess player has about the game of chess, the more information it 
will have to analyze before making a move.  Although, in general, 
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consciousness alone is a poor means for understanding underlying 
mental causation, in this case it was indicative of an underlying 
mechanism.  Neuroscientists have explained the ―know-how‖ 
phenomenon by the fact that when two neurons are simultaneously 
excited, the connection between them is strengthened.
14
  Newer 
models of AI (―connectionist‖ models) have incorporated links like 
these into programming, but they are poor models for neural nets.  
Ultimately, even connectionist programming boils down to binary 
code. 
For the sake of argument, however, let us grant that 
neuronal impulses are the source of consciousness and that binary 
code is a decent model for them.  The question now is whether 
being a model is good enough to produce consciousness, or if there 
is some further biological feature necessary.  For binary code to 
model neuronal information processing, one must be able to 
imagine that at any given moment, the neurons of the brain can be 
mapped syntactically.  The alteration of patterns in binary code 
must produce output to the alteration of neuronal patterns.  A 
recent study led by Mriganka Sur casts doubt on the causal nature 
of brain structure.  Sur and his colleagues performed surgery on 
newborn ferrets,
15
 so that each had one eye that sprouted 
connections into the part of the brain that is generally dedicated to 
hearing (rather than into the visual thalamus and visual cortex).  
                                                 
14
 Dreyfus, Hubert L. What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. 
15
 Granted, I stated at the beginning of this paper that I was not going to tackle 
the notion of animal consciousness.  However, the scientific community often 
extrapolates findings concerning animal physiology to humans, and I am 
assuming that this study is accurate in suggesting that there would be similar 
findings if we were to perform this study in humans. 
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There was no resulting change in the ferrets; they continued to see 
with the affected eyes, using the auditory portions of their brains.
16
  
An immediate change in neuronal patterns (and in our imaginary 
syntax which we have mapped onto the brain) produces no change 
in consciousness.  This suggests plasticity of consciousness that is 
not observed in the output of AI.  By comparison, it is difficult to 
believe that significant change in syntax would not produce 
observable change in computer function.  In other words, in the 
case of computer syntax, there is a conditional relationship: if there 
is considerable change in syntax, there will be change in output.
17
  
For neurons, we have seen the equivalent conditional statement 
disproved.  Here we have established lack of correlation between 
the result of neuronal behavior and that of syntactical 
programming; at the very least, we must conclude that current 
efforts to use computer syntax to model brain functions are 
fundamentally flawed.  Just as a fundamental change in a recipe 
would not necessarily produce an observable change in outcome, 
but would very likely do so, this does not prove that syntax does 
not produce consciousness, but it suggests as much. 
 
VI. Discussion 
We have established that if neuronal impulses and 
syntactical programming each produce consciousness, they must 
                                                 
16
 Alva Noe, Out of our Heads: Why You are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons 
from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009),  53-54. 
17
 One possible response to my argument would be a rejection of this claim.  I 
am not a computer scientist, so I cannot say with absolute certainty that such a 
response would be unfounded.  However, I think it is undisputable that if the 
syntax experienced the same degree of change as the neuronal impulses in this 
example, there would be noticeable change. 
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do it in different ways.  Stalwart defenders of AI might claim that 
this is possible: that AI and the brain are fundamentally different 
from one another, yet produce equally valid consciousness.  To 
defend themselves, they would likely revert to the problem of other 
minds.  However, as I have already claimed, the problem of other 
minds should be dismissed as subjective.  The claim that 
consciousness could be formed in two completely different ways 
is, first and foremost, unrealistic.  It stems, I believe, from the 
belief that consciousness is spiritual – that it rises above and 
inhabits the physical world.  If we instead accept consciousness for 
what it is – a biological phenomenon – it seems no more likely that 
computer programming (having proved dissimilar to the brain in 
every important way) could produce it than any other biological 
phenomenon (e.g. photosynthesis).  Furthermore, if we reject the 
spiritual view of consciousness, yet accept that consciousness 
could be produced in a way that does not model the workings of 
the brain, we have no basis to judge what is conscious and what is 
not.   The notion of consciousness becomes meaningless. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that there is good reason to 
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